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JOINT LOGISTICS CANNOT WORK WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 10, AND THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT AND LOGISTICS REORGANIZATION
We need to change the logistics systems. Logistics has always been central to the military. But it's also been a drag on what the military can do. And right now, it's a drag on the transformation because so much money and so many people are absorbed in logistics processes that we need to reach for new constructs."
-Arthur Cebrowski, February 2004
For decades, the United States has served as the world's model for how to plan and execute military logistics, but it is clear that the growing demands of global deployments and rapid-response operations call for changes in how the nation supports and sustains its forces. 2 The Bush administration's strategy for transformation and winning of the Global War on • Directive authority over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
• Prescribing the chain of command, subordinate commanders, selecting Combatant Command staff.
• Organizing the command and employing his forces as necessary.
• Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders and employing forces, as he considers necessary.
• Coordinating administration support and convening courts-martial. 6 In order to understand why programmatic problems exist in DOD logistics structures (and thus the execution of logistics operations); one must also understand the history of the GNA.
The GNA is part of a continuum of congressional interests, proposals, and acts dating from 1921-1945 that combine or unify military departments under a single executive agency.
However, no legislative action resulted from these proposals due largely to opposition from the War and Navy Departments. 7 World War II (WWII) required the strategic planning, movement, and sustainment of numerous ground, air, and sea-based operations. Additionally, the evolution of air support by the Army Air Corps and the Navy amplified the interoperability issues among the Armed Forces, which further demanded an enormous unity of effort among the Service Chiefs. In 1945, because of interoperability and command and control (C2) issues, General George C. Marshall proposed to the President and Congress the establishment of a Unified Defense Department. The intent of the GNA was to formulate the balance of Joint and Service interests, not to frustrate Service prerogatives. The Services were and would remain the most important elements of the Department of Defense. The nine objectives of the GNA are still the foundations on which everything else has to been resourced and structured in today's DOD.
One aim of GNA was to ensure that those responsible for national security on the strategic and operational levels had commensurate authority to implement their decisions; hence, the furor over making certain that the Combatant Commanders had sufficient command authority over the forces assigned to them.
The GNA requires the assignment of forces under the jurisdiction of the Services to the Combatant Commands based upon their geographic area of responsibility, except as otherwise directed by the SecDef. The exceptions include forces assigned to perform the specific missions of the Service (e.g., recruit, supply, equip, maintain). 10 The Those logistics functions include supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and additional services such as procurement, contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition and disposal. 13 The linchpin for DOD logistics support for the Combatant
Commander rests with the Service Chiefs Title 10 responsibilities for logistics functions.
However, as outlined in Title 10, Chapter 6, section 161, paragraph C, the Combatant Commander has the same responsibility when he employs forces, so there is duplication in nature that continues to effect logistics support requirements.
At the strategic level, DOD has no single-centralized joint manager for defense logistics or indicate that Service-provided logistics still challenge the Combatant Commander's operational movement, readiness, and ability to maintain optimal tactical combat effectiveness simply because he lacks the joint integration and a single organization to manage and oversee all logistics functions.
The Combatant Commander loses unity of effort and synergy because his directive authority takes effect only when the logistics assets and resources arrive in his theater of operation. The lack of integration of sustainment and logistics planning causes tremendous duplication of effort by the Services. 14 The lack of joint logistics planning and execution makes logistics unnecessarily complex, which creates inefficiencies in distribution, sustainment, and interoperable logistics automation systems -not to mention a lack of theater asset visibility.
The Services continue to build "Iron Mountains" that influence the flow of combat forces and capabilities available for the Combatant Commander's use. In the end, logistics may dictate or change the Combatant Commander's operational plan, scheme of maneuver, and exit strategy. The GAO study concluded USCENTCOM still has shortfalls in transportation, asset visibility, as well as the necessary equipment and supplies --all that greatly affect the USCENTCOM Commanders force readiness, availability, and operational employment of its forces. More importantly, the study indicated "an i nsufficient and ineffective distribution capability in the theater due to the delay in inadequate transportation assets. Cargo trucks and materiel handling equipment were simply not available within the theater of operations when needed. Moreover, to add to the delays in supply distribution, cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets were repackaged multiple times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. The Services had failed to comply with DOD's requirement to tag all cargo with the automation identification technology (AIT) tags. In addition, DOD's lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation assets. According to the study, one of the major causes of distribution problems during OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and equipment did not deploy to the theater until after combat troops arrived. In fact, most Army logistics personnel did not arrive until after major combat operations were underway, and when they did arrive, they arrived without adequate training in various logistics functions -from operating material handling equipment to managing theater distribution centers". 
JOINT LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS
Focused Logistics is the fusion of logistics information and transportation technologies for rapid crisis response, deployment and sustainment, the ability to track and shift units, equipment and supplies even while en route, and delivery of tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly to the warfighter. The challenge is that Service parochialisms hinder the optimal use of the Services supported logistics, even after sixteen years of the inter-Service cooperation and jointness created by the GNA. As General Tommy Franks, USCENTCOM Commander for the GWOT noted, "For the first time, we had reliant operations, where one service is reliant on the performance of another. I believe that is transformational. As effective as those forces were, to maximize their potential, these concepts require concurrent organizational structure change."
The Army is shifting to smaller and more agile units, the Air Force is learning to better support ground forces, and the Navy is swapping crews to allow fewer ships greater global coverage.
The Marine Corps, long the most innovative of the Services, is striding toward greater flexibility and utility, ensuring its place as America's emergency force. MCO JOC is to achieve decisive conclusions to combat operations and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation --using a joint, interdependent force at all points of action necessary.
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JV 2020 encompasses four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics as shown in Figure 1 . 
Information Superiority

Focus ed Logis tics
Joint Vision 2020
Dedicated individuals and innovative organizations transforming the joint force for the 21st Century to achieve full spectrum dominance :
-persuasive in peace -decisive in war -preeminent in any form of conflict
The development of information superiority and technological innovation will enable these operational concepts. Each warfighting capability will contribute to achieving full spectrum dominance as outlined in the 2020 strategic document. JV 2020 emphasizes that future logistics capability must use all viable assets and resources more effectively, as well as integrate technologies (rather than Service-centric concepts) to conduct military actions intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. 23 JV 2020 demands more than immediate change to the logistics footprint and streamlined logistics, it requires the following to six elements to support DOD Transformation:
• Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution
• Multinational Logistics
• Agile Infrastructure
• Force Health Protection
• Information Fusion
• Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control (C 2 ).
These focused logistics requirements cannot be met working with in the current parameters of Service-centric paradigms. The transformation of joint logistics cannot fully change or be implemented unless DOD changes the logistics infrastructure and gives the Combatant Commander the requisite resources and authority to C2, train, service, sustain, and maintain his joint logistics forces and their capabilities as directed by the GNA.
The best place to push these changes to support joint theater logistics requirements for USTRANSCOM, as the distribution process owner (DPO), has become the real keeper of the pipeline to balance customer requirements from factory to foxhole. Balancing these factors is critical to ensuring that sustainment and normal peacetime logistics gets to where it is required when it is required. The DPO's span of influence encompasses only the distribution system. Working with USJFCOM as the joint deployment process owner (JDPO) and our national logistics industry partners, the ULA will bring together all players throughout the logistics spectrum to optimize and create an integrated, interoperable logistics system. Linking the talents of the of all logistics agencies under one Command will also leverage ongoing transformation initiatives. The ULA will be better able to forecast requirements, synchronize the sources of supply with in conjunction with the DPO, identify modes of transportation, and expeditiously respond to the customer.
A balance between logistics and combat forces at the beginning of hostilities is imperative. 
CONCLUSION
Where there is unity, there is always victory. Established properly, with ample joint training and exercise, habitual relationships, confidence, and standard operating procedures, a DOD Unified Logistics Agency and the Joint Logistics Commands would allow for unity of effort across the entire logistics spectrum enabling a key ingredient to support the Combatant Commander's responsibilities outlined in Title 10 and the GNA. A more unified logistics support arm will allow the nation to continue to achieve its wartime and peacetime goals and respond quickly to its military obligations.
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